Introduction
In an influential paper, Hamilton (1983) found within a vector autoregression (VAR) framework that oil price change has a strong causal and negative correlation with real U.S.GNP growth from 1948 to 1980. Mork (1989) showed that when the sample period is extended to 1988:2 the correlation becomes only marginally significant, and more importantly that there is an asymmetry in effects: GNP growth has a definite negative correlation with oil price increases and a statistically insignificant correlation with oil price decreases. Burbidge and Harrison (1984) using somewhat different data and methods also found significant impacts of oil and energy shocks on real activity for the U.S.
1 Using annual data, Mory (1993) showed that increases and decreases in real oil prices have asymmetric effects on output and other macrovariables variables from 1951 to 1990, and on personal income and earnings in most industries from 1959 to 1989. Darby (1982) made international comparisons of oil shock impacts within a VAR framework and found for the U.S. that the estimated oil shock effect was much reduced if price controls during the 1970s were taken into account. Hooker (1994) found the predictive power of oil shocks on macrovariables diminishes as the sample is further updated. These studies generally show that the effect of oil price increases and decreases have asymmetric effects on the economy and that the effects vary across time and countries.
As noted by Mork, until the oil price collapse in late 1985 the major oil shocks since 1948 were price increases. Since 1986:1 a pattern of large price increases and decreases is reflected in a substantial rise in the volatility of real oil price as illustrated in Table 1 . Wide swings in real oil price during 1986
and 1987 have continued into the 1990s. For example, real oil price fell by 20 percent in 1990:2, rose by about 40 percent and 30 percent in 1990:3 and 1990:4 fell by 34 percent and 9 percent in 1991:1 and 1991:2. The real oil price in 1991:2 was almost back at the level one year earlier having almost doubled 1 They used monthly data in a VAR over 1962-82 to examine the impact of oil shocks in several OECD countries and found that the impact on Industrial Production was larger for the U.S. and U.K. than that for other countries.
during the interim. More recently a fall in the real oil price of about 13 percent in 1992:1 was followed by a rise of about 13 percent in 1992:2.
Our objective in this paper is to further explore the issue of causality of real oil price to the macroeconomy in the light of experience up to 1992. Unlike earlier periods, movements in real oil price and GNP during 1986 GNP during :2-1987 GNP during :3 and 1990 GNP during :4-1992 3 have a positive correlation. This reversal in the relationship and large swings in real oil price provide an opportunity to further explore the relationship between oil price and GNP. A brief discussion of some results for different sample periods will help motivate the study. Mork (1989) : real GNP growth; GNP deflator inflation; 3-month Treasury bill rate; unemployment rate; wage inflation (average hourly earnings for production workers in manufacturing); import price inflation;
and real oil price changes. As suggested in footnote 2, real oil price changes are calculated following Mork (1989) . Data are from Citibase. Variables are in annual percentage terms. In summary, using Mork's model, we find similar results for the period considered by him, and further deterioration in the predictive power of oil price shocks for real GNP as the sample is further updated.
Results from an eight variable VAR show that real oil price increases are significant at 5 percent The F values are different from those appearing in Table 1 in Mork (1989) . This is probably due to several factors. While Mork's method is followed in that refiners acquisition cost for crude oil is used rather than the PPI (because of the price controls of the 1970s) when possible, monthly oil price data is averaged to obtain quarterly observations rather than using a single monthly observation during a three month period to represent a quarterly observation as in Mork. In addition, the import price variable is exclusive of movement in the price of oil imports. Mork noted the decline in statistical significance of real oil price change when the sample is extended to 1988:2. However, for his data, real oil price change was marginally significant at the 7% level. Also, Mork found the oil price increase variable to be somewhat more statistically significant for the period 1949:1-1988:2 than that reported here. 4 The suggestion that the prior pattern of relative price change has real consequences is not new. It has been argued by Davis (1987) and Hamilton (1988b) that the predicted effects of a given change in real oil price (or relative material price) are quite different depending upon the previous pattern of oil price change. 5 It should be emphasized that this outcome holds even for periods that exclude the mid and late 1980s and early 1990s.
THE MODEL OF PRICE VARIABILITY
A distinguishing feature of the model employed in this paper from earlier work is incorporation of an oil shock variable normalized by a measure of oil price variability. A univariate GARCH error process is used to compute the unexpected component and conditional variance of real oil price. 6 These variables are then used to augment the VAR system of Hamilton and Mork.
A univariate regression with error GARCH (p,q) error process in the quarterly rate of change in real oil price z t , can be represented as
where
. 
The metric e t does not reflect changes in conditional variability over time. When the data generating process is described by equations (1) and (2) a measure of an unexpected oil shock that does reflect the magnitude and the variability of the forecast error e t , might be defined as (3) It is the central hypothesis of this papers that e t * can be expected to have a more systematic causal relation to the real GNP than either z t or e t . The intuition is that a given unexpected rate of change in real oil price will have a smaller impact on real activity when conditional variances are large since much of the change in real oil price will be regarded as transitory. The variable can be thought of as being a measure of how different a given oil price change is from the historical pattern.
to macroeconomic variables) the choice of right hand variables of equation (1) would seem to be limited to lagged values of the dependent variable. A search over alternative specifications for x t-1 , including various lag lengths, and the three month T-bill rate, rate of change in the GNP deflator, and the unemployment rate as possible explanatory variables did not result in finding a variable with statistical significance at the 5 percent level in explaining z t . When z t is regressed on its own lags, lags one to four and lag eight are significant at the 5 percent level. Since the first four lags alone make the Ljung-Box Q statistic with 36 lags statistically insignificant, only the first four lags are included.
GARCH(1,1) was adopted as a parsimonious representation of the process of conditional variance of {e t } in equation (1) with r = 4 and s = 0.
7 Table 3 presents parameter estimates of equation
(1). The GARCH(1,1) parameters are significant and have the correct sign. 8 The sum of (2.405)
indicates the conditional variance process is highly persistent, i.e., integrated GARCH with integration order higher than 1 (see Engle and Bollerslev (1986) 
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The normalized oil price shocks in real oil price usually assumes smaller magnitudes after 1974 relative to magnitudes assumed before 1974. In terms of Hamilton's (1983) oil price episode classification, an analysis of oil price change in terms of rather than z t raises the importance of the oil and 7 Bollerslev, Chou, and Kroner (1992; p. 10 and p. 20) argue in favor of low-order GARCH modeling, and especially for GARCH(1,1). 8 For the sample period 50:1-86:1 the coefficient on h t-1 is not significant although that of is significant at the 5 percent level. For the sample period 50:1-88:2, both parameter estimates are significant. For all three sample periods, the parameter estimates of GARCH(1,1) indicate persistence in conditional variance of e. In the VAR results presented below a GARCH system is estimated for each sample period corresponding to the sample period over which each VAR is estimated. The VAR results do not substantively change if the model reported in Table 3 were used to generate in all the VAR models. 9 When three dummies for structural shifts in the dates used are included in GARCH(1,1), the sum of decreases to 1.30, and when an ARCH (4) is used the sum of the γ coefficients is reduced slightly. These alternative models of conditional variance of oil prices do not change the main results of the paper. 10 See Nelson (1990) , Bougerol and Picard (1992) , and Lumsdaine (1991) for discussion of the asymptotic properties of integrated GARCH models. It has been noted by several researchers that persistence in the conditional variance process could be 
THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The consequence of introducing surprises in the rate of change in real oil price change normalized by their conditional standard deviation, , to various VAR systems is reported in Table 4 .
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It can be seen from the second line of Table 4 that normalized oil price shock is highly significant for all three sample periods while real oil price change is insignificant. The issue of asymmetric effects of normalized positive oil price shocks is explored in the remainder of Table 4 . Two variables are defined for normalized shocks in oil price equal to either the positive or the negative values of and zero elsewhere. It can be seen from the exclusion tests for the nine and ten variable systems in Table 4 that positive normalized shocks are highly significant in all three sample periods. Negative normalized oil price shocks are not statistically significant in any of the VAR systems. In the presence of positive and negative normalized oil price shocks the variables oil price change and positive and negative oil price changes do not achieve statistical significance. Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) found a substantial decline in the persistence in stock return variance when intercept dummies are included (see also (1986)). Table 2 . It can be seen that unexpected oil price change is not statistically significant. We also find that the predictive power of expected oil price change on GNP growth resembles that of the actual oil price change and is insignificant. The detailed results are not reported here. changes replace z t and positive and negative normalized shocks replace appear in the lower part of Table 5 . The coefficients on positive normalized shocks are all negative. For all sample periods the hypothesis of pairwise equality of the coefficients on normalized unexpected oil price increases and decreases can be rejected at the one percent level, as can the hypothesis of parameter change as the sample is extended from 1986:1 to later periods.
* t e The above results are robust for variation in lag length and model specification. For example, if the import inflation variable is omitted, the asymmetry observed by Mork disappears, whereas the normalized shock is still significant. For the whole sample period, in the seven variable VAR system 1 in Table 2 , the F-statistic (p-value) of oil price increases becomes 1.574 (0.182) (oil price decreases becomes 0.957 (0.433)) when the import price variable is excluded. Following this exclusion for the seven variable VAR system 3 in Table 4 , the F-statistic (p-value) for oil price change becomes 0.988(0.416) and for e * becomes 4.991(0.001). Similarly, while increases in lag length change some results, normalized shocks remain significant.
14 Table 6 reports results of a VAR model including only GNP growth and oil price changes. Results are similar to those reported above for larger VAR systems. Normalized oil price shocks provide significant information for GNP growth in all periods, and positive normalized shocks are more important than negative normalized shocks in explaining GNP growth.
As an additional check of the robustness of the predictive power of the normalized oil price shock variable we pursued a suggestion by James Hamilton that the relationship between the impulse response of real GNP growth obtained from a nonparametric kernel estimate and be examined. Table 4 , if lag is 6, then the p-value for e* is 2.601 (0.021), and if lag is 8 then it is 2.018 (0.052). In the 10 variable VAR in Table 4 where k it are the Gaussian kernel weights given by Pagan and Hong (1991) :
and the bandwidths ψ k are set to be the sample standard deviations of y t-k multiplied by T
1/(5+L)
. The nonlinear impulse response (with L set to be 3) is defined as )]. ,..,
When regression equations were run with different forecasting horizons, n, with ξ t+n as dependent variable and e *+ and e *-as independent variables it was found that e *+ is significant for every n whereas e Results consistent with those obtained above emerge when a variance decomposition metric is used as an alternative to F-statistics (see, for instance, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) for the pros and cons of the two metrics). The fractions of the variance of the forecasted GNP growth accounted for by nine elements (excluding the lags of growth itself) in the ten-variable VAR (in Table 4 ). At horizons of 3, 4, 5, and 6 years, however, the variance accounted for by e *+ attains values close to 27% while that of the T-bill is about 23.6%.
IMPULSE RESPONSES OF OUTPUT AND UNEMPLOYMENT
The impact of on GNP growth and unemployment over multiple horizons is investigated using orthogonalized impulse responses. The impulse responses are obtained form a moving average representation of a seven-variable VAR with variables placed in the following order: GNP growth, GNP deflator inflation, unemployment, the 3-month Treasury bill rate, real wage growth, import price inflation, and . The ordering of the VAR implicitly assumes that e *+ does not affect current GNP growth. The middle line in Figure 1 illustrates the response in GNP growth to a one-standard-error shock in . Five negative responses are followed by five positive responses, with the effect of the oil shock greatly diminished after ten quarters. larger than one-half the largest negative impulse response obtained at the 4-quarter horizon. The negative sum suggests that there is a decline in the level of GNP over 24 horizons following an oil shock.
The results for the unemployment rate are somewhat stronger. Except for the first two small negative responses, Figure 2 shows persistent positive responses of unemployment to a shock in . The sum of 24 responses is 1.86 and five responses are statistically significant, i.e., those at the 4 through 8 quarter horizons. This indicates a cumulative loss in employment that is not offset at later dates by subsequent increase in the GNP growth rate during the second and third years following an oil price shock. While the impulse of GNP growth reaches a positive peak at the 8-quarter horizon, the response of unemployment at the 8-quarter horizon is significantly different from zero. This might indicate that the + * t e recovery in output after an oil shock is mainly accounted for by an increase in productivity. This explanation may be consistent with the finding of Blanchard (1989) that the variance of productivity innovation is three times larger than the variance of labor force participation innovation.
CONCLUSION
This paper has presented results on the causal relationship of normalized oil price shocks to real GNP growth. Results suggest that a real oil price surprise has a greater impact on real GNP (and unemployment) the more stable has been the real price of oil prior to the innovation. An asymmetry in effects was found to exist in that only positive normalized oil price shocks were statistically significant. This specification was stable over time, fitting observations before and after 1985, and results were similar whether or not other variables (including other functions of real oil price change) were included.
The results obtained in the paper are potentially explicable in the context of models containing multiple sectors and resource reallocation costs, or models capturing recent developments in the theory of investment as surveyed by Dixit (1992) . A rise in real oil price that is large relative to recent volatility will result in reallocation of resources and the lowering of aggregate output (at least during the transition).
During periods of high volatility in real oil price, since current oil price contains little information about future oil price, rational agents will be reluctant to reallocate resources in the presence of real costs of doing so.
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The asymmetric effect of change in real oil price follows from a sectorial shifts story since a fall in real oil price also results in resource reallocation with unemployment and output effects that mitigate positive macroeconomic effects. The asymmetry would be further reinforced given an "uncertainty" effect based on the new investment theory. In this framework the increased degree of uncertainty associated with higher volatility in real oil prices would result in investment being postponed. Hence, the positive macro effect of an oil price decline would also be somewhat offset by depressing effects of increased uncertainty.
It would also probably be appropriate to expand the search for explanations of the way in which oil affects economic activity to models containing rigidities. One of the strong results in the work conducted in this paper is the effect of e t * on the level of unemployment. These results are as robust as those for output growth but qualitatively opposite. Mork and Hall (1980) concerning the effects of unexpected events in the presence of rigid wages. It is also worth noting that the unemployment variable in the GNP growth equation is statistically significant at the one percent level in all samples. 19 The application of models containing rigidities is also in part suggested by the results of Kim and Loungani (1992) . Within a conventional RBC model they found only a relatively small contribution of oil price shocks to an explanation for variability in output. The content of this section of the paper owes a great deal to suggestions made by Knut Mork, particularly on the need to examine models containing rigidities. Mork (1989) ; real GNP growth; GNP deflator inflation; 3-month T-bill rate; unemployment rate; wage inflation; price inflation. 
